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Abstract People in a positive mood process information
in ways that reinforce and maintain this positive mood. The
current studies examine how positive mood inﬂuences
responses to social comparisons and demonstrates that
people in a positive mood interpret ambiguous information
about comparison others in self-beneﬁtting ways. Speciﬁ-
cally, four experiments demonstrate that compared to
negative mood or neutral mood participants, participants in
a positive mood engage in effortful re-interpretations of
ambiguously similar comparison targets so that they may
assimilate to upward comparison targets and contrast from
downward comparison targets.
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Introduction
All seasons are beautiful for the person who carries
happiness within.
-Horace Friess
The quote above suggests that positive mood is associ-
ated with a sunny or benevolent outlook on life that leads to
additional happiness. Indeed, there is a growing psycho-
logical literature demonstrating that positive mood begets
positive mood. For example, the broaden and build model
(Fredrickson 2001) has shown that happiness can create an
upward spiral in which positive emotions broaden attention
and cognition. Because of this broader perceptual
approach, happy individuals are able to ﬁnd positive
meaning in events, which increases the level of positive
emotions. Similarly, work on mood-congruency has shown
that happy individuals are more attentive to positive
information in the environment and therefore may be more
likely to ﬁnd information that reinforces positive moods
(Tamir and Robinson 2007). More recently, researchers
have shown that individuals in a positive mood are able to
transform mood-threatening tasks into mood-beneﬁting
tasks (Hirt et al. 2008). With the current research, we
extend the idea that happy individuals are able to ﬁnd
positivity in their environment and argue that happy indi-
viduals are alchemists, of a sort, able to convert ambiguity
into positivity, to convert lead into gold.
Speciﬁcally, we focus on the role that mood may play in
person perception—the perception of comparison targets.
We argue that when comparisons are detrimental to self-
evaluations, the cognitive ﬂexibility afforded by a positive
mood allows people to reinterpret ambiguous information
about social comparison targets in a self-serving manner. In
addition, we argue that such self-serving interpretations are
limited to situations in which perceivers have both the
opportunity (the presence of ambiguous information) and
the resources (cognitive resources) to engage in self-serv-
ing re-interpretations of information about targets.
Responding to social comparisons
In a typical day, most people encounter a bevy of peers and
colleagues with whom they could compare themselves.
Such social comparisons are one means by which
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individuals gain information about their status or standing,
particularly in the absence of objective criteria (Festinger
1954). In particular, individuals may engage in upward
comparisons with more successful others as a means of
learning about their deﬁciencies and how to remedy them
or they may engage in downward comparisons with less
successful others as a means of feeling more positive about
themselves (Wills 1981; Wood 1989). Responses to social
comparisons are driven by person perception—the per-
ceptions of comparison targets—and subtle differences in
how the target is perceived can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on those responses. Encountering another person is not
enough to ensure that people will gain information about
themselves from the encounter. Rather, individuals, or
perceivers, must view the other person as an appropriate
target for comparison (Festinger 1954). If a target is
deemed inappropriate for comparison, a casual encounter is
unlikely to have lasting effects, if any at all. Therefore,
perceptions of comparison targets as similar or different
and as holding particular traits (e.g. unsuccessful, intelli-
gent, attractive) are important in determining if perceivers
will respond to the comparison.
In addition to determining whether a target is appro-
priate for comparison, perceptions also determine how
individuals will respond to a target. Responses to com-
parison targets fall into two broad categories: Self-judg-
ments may be assimilated towards the target or contrasted
away from the target. How one categorizes or deﬁnes a
comparison target is an important determinant of whether
assimilation or contrast with a target occurs (see e.g.,
Lockwood and Kunda 1997; Johnson and Stapel 2007). For
example, individuals assimilate with targets who are
viewed as attainable and contrast with targets who are
viewed as unattainable (Lockwood and Kunda 1997). In
this way, small shifts in perceptions of comparison targets
may have important consequences for self-judgments and
behaviors.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that perceptions of
comparison targets are relatively static and irrevocable;
once a perceiver categorizes a target in a particular way,
this categorization does not change. According to this
assumption, responses to comparisons depend upon per-
ceptions of the target. For example, as shown in the right-
most portion of Fig. 1, if perceptions of the target lead
individuals to contrast their self-views with the target,
contrast with both upward and downward comparison
targets is expected, regardless of the impact on self-eval-
uations. In this way, responses to comparison targets are
often assumed to be symmetric (Mussweiler 2003; Wood
1989).
Imagine that a student has determined that a classmate
represents a standard of performance against which she
should compare herself, leading her to focus on differences
in levels of performance between herself and the target.
Her self-evaluations should typically show a contrast
effect, such that a successful classmate lowers self-evalu-
ations and an unsuccessful classmate raises self-evalua-
tions. This is what we call a symmetric response: contrast
with both upward and downward comparisons. Corre-
spondingly, if our student has determined that a classmate
is similar to the self in an important way (e.g., they scored
similarly well on recent IQ tests) or in an unimportant but
distinctive way (e.g., they are born on the exact same day),
this typically leads to a focus on similarities in performance
(see Mussweiler 2003; Stapel and Marx 2007). The focus
on similarities should lead to an assimilation effect on self-
evaluations, such that a more successful classmate leads to
raised self-evaluations and a less successful classmate
leads to lowered self-evaluations. This is also a symmetric
response: assimilation with both upward and downward
comparisons.
1
Recent research, however, has shown that asymmetric
responses may also occur (Schwinghammer et al. 2006;
Stapel and Johnson 2007; Stapel and Koomen 2001a, b).
For example, Stapel and Johnson (2007) found that fol-
lowing threats to positive self-evaluations, individuals
responded to ambiguous targets in a self-serving and
asymmetric manner: contrast with less successful targets
and assimilation with more successful targets. In this study,
psychology majors learned about a social science major
from the same university. The relationship between the
ﬁelds of psychology and social science is ambiguous and
could be resolved in a number of ways. How participants
resolved this ambiguity depended on whether or not they
had just experienced a threat to self-evaluations. For those
under threat, when it was advantageous to stress similarity
between the two majors (i.e., when the target was inferior),
the target was perceived as an appropriate comparison
target and they contrasted their self-evaluations with the
target (‘‘I am better than she is.’’). Conversely, when it was
advantageous to stress dissimilarity between the two
majors (i.e., when the target was superior), participants
perceived the target was inappropriate for comparison and
their self-evaluations were not changed (‘‘She is different,
not relevant’’). Thus, perceptions of comparison targets as
similar depended upon which perception best ﬁt the self-
evaluation maintenance goals of the participants.
These earlier studies found asymmetric responses to
social comparison in response to self-evaluation threat,
1 This is not to say that people merely accept negative inﬂuences on
self-evaluations. In fact, people are adept at avoiding and minimizing
negative effects. However, most research on self-evaluation mainte-
nance has focused on how individuals shift perceptions following
comparison to make the comparison less valid, not on how individuals
can shift their categorization and identiﬁcation of the comparison
targets to change from assimilation to contrast.
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here, we suggest that positive mood may also lead to
asymmetric responding. Our argument rests upon the
rationale that just as positive mood states allow individuals
to convert negative experiences into positive experiences
through attention and identiﬁcation of rewarding stimuli
(Tamir and Robinson 2007); the ﬂexible cognitive style
associated with positive mood states may also facilitate the
resolution of ambiguity in ways that maximize self-
evaluations.
Positive mood, ﬂexibility, and resolving ambiguity
Positive and negative moods are associated with different
approaches to information processing (Clore et al. 2001;
Fredrickson and Joiner 2002). Positive mood is associated
with ﬂexible, open, and global processing (Fo ¨rster et al.
2008). For example, positive mood leads to increased
ﬂexibility (for reviews see Bless 2001; Martin and Clore
2001), creativity (Isen et al. 1987; Murray et al. 1990), and
a preference for top-down as opposed to bottom-up pro-
cessing of trait information (Isbell 2004). For instance,
Murray et al. (1990) found that individuals in a positive
mood were more cognitively ﬂexible in categorizing
objects. In that study, participants focused on similarities or
differences between two television shows. Those in a
positive mood listed more unique similarities and differ-
ences. That is, they were better able to make ﬁne distinc-
tions when comparing or contrasting two objects.
Given the relationship between threat and self-serving
perceptions, one might expect that negative, and not posi-
tive mood, should be associated with self-serving percep-
tions. However, we argue that the cognitive abilities and
tendencies associated with negative mood make them less
likely. Negative mood may be characterized as vigilantly
objective processing with rigorous attention to the
environment and relative adherence to the data at hand
(Schwarz 1990). Therefore, negative mood may impede the
creative ﬂexibility required for self-serving perceptions.
For example, in a negative mood, individuals are less likely
to abandon an established mental set (Gasper 2003), less
likely to show false memory effects (Storbeck and Clore
2005), and are more attentive to local details (Avramova
and Stapel 2008;F o ¨rster et al. 2008; Gasper and Clore
2002).
Building on this research, we suggest that the cognitive
ﬂexibility associated with positive mood may be used to
categorize ambiguous comparison targets in self-serving
ways. That is, when faced with a comparison that could
Fig. 1 Social comparison processes in neutral and negative mood (with the extra steps associated with positive mood inside the shaded box)
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harm self-views, individuals in a positive mood are better
able to attend to minute details and draw ﬁne distinctions
that allow them to assimilate, contrast, or disregard the
comparison information in order to beneﬁt self-views.
The steps leading to asymmetric responding
The shaded area of Fig. 1 illustrates the steps to asym-
metric responding. As suggested by earlier work (Stapel
and Johnson 2007), asymmetric responses to social com-
parison occur when information about comparison targets
is ambiguous. Whereas some information about compari-
son targets is concrete and not open to interpretation (e.g.
biological sex), much of what perceivers know about others
results from perceptual processes that can be guided by
attitudes and preferences, such that even the perception of
race can be altered (Caruso et al. 2009). Because of this,
ambiguous information about targets (information that can
be interpreted in more than one way) can be used strate-
gically to beneﬁt self-views. Speciﬁcally, we propose that
in the presence of this ambiguous information, positive
mood may initiate a process by which information about
targets is reinterpreted until comparison with that target
beneﬁts self-evaluations.
Current studies
Our purpose is to understand how and when cognitive
ﬂexibility associated with positive mood allows individuals
to interpret ambiguous information about comparison
others in order to beneﬁt self-evaluations. We brieﬂy
explore the consequences of negative mood, but focus our
attention largely on illuminating the consequences of
positive mood for social comparison. Fours studies exam-
ine how and when positive mood leads to self-serving
responses to comparison targets.
Given that there are many ways in which perceptions of
targets can be shifted in order to change the predominant
response from contrast to assimilation (and vice versa)
(Mussweiler 2003; Stapel and Koomen 2001a, b), the
present studies capitalized on the differential effects of
judging a target to be generally similar or distinctively
similar (Stapel and Marx 2007). General similarity comes
from sharing a common trait and leads perceivers to view a
target as relevant enough to engage in contrastive com-
parisons (‘‘you are similar enough for me compare with’’).
Alternatively, distinctive similarity is based on sharing an
uncommon trait or having a unique or unusual connection
(e.g. ‘‘we are both similarly different from others’’) that
typically leads to assimilation. Imagine, for example, two
college students. If both students dislike exams (a common
trait among university students), this widespread back-
ground trait is likely to be used as the basis for further
(contrastive) comparison processes on other trait dimen-
sions. However, if both students play the tuba (a rare trait
among university students), then they may be seen as dis-
tinctively and uniquely similar, and this unique similarity is
likely to be generalized to other trait dimensions leading to
assimilation.
As shown in the shaded portion of Fig. 1, individuals in
a positive mood are expected to evaluate the distinctiveness
of comparison targets in self-serving ways. Distinctive
similarity information is particularly vulnerable to self-
serving responding because information about distinctive
similarity is relatively ambiguous and open to interpreta-
tion [people are inexperienced with using base rate infor-
mation and judgments of prevalence are highly susceptible
to irrelevant information (Kahneman and Tversky 1973)].
This ambiguity allows individuals to interpret distinctive
similarity as meaningful when it concerns an upward
standard (e.g., ‘‘we are uniquely similar and therefore share
all kinds of traits’’), but as meaningless when it concerns a
downward standard (e.g., ‘‘what does playing the tuba have
to do with math skills?’’). By presenting participants with
distinctive similarity information we can detect when self-
serving interpretations are occurring.
In the present research, we ﬁrst establish that manipu-
lations of mood do not inﬂuence self-evaluations in the
absence of social comparisons. In this pilot study, we tested
a autobiographical mood induction procedure that has been
employed by earlier research and shown to be effective
(Krauth-Gruber and Ric 2000). Then, in Experiment 1, we
tested the initial assumption of the model presented in
Fig. 1: that ambiguous similarity information must be
present in order for positive mood to lead to self-serving
interpretations of that information. Speciﬁcally, in Exper-
iment 1, following a positive mood induction, participants
viewed ambiguous similarity information or no informa-
tion about a comparison target. We expected mood effects
on responses to comparisons only when ambiguous simi-
larity information was present. In the presence of ambig-
uous information, participants in a positive mood were
expected to respond asymmetrically: assimilating to
upward comparison targets and contrasting with downward
targets. In the absence of ambiguous information, respon-
ses were expected to be symmetric, even if self-evaluations
were harmed.
Experiment 2 replicates this effect and examines the
effect of negative mood on responding. In Experiment 2,
following a positive or negative mood induction manipu-
lation, participants received ambiguous similarity or no
information about a comparison target. Again, the
responses of participants in a positive mood were expected
to be asymmetric and self-serving: assimilation to upward
comparison targets and contrast with downward targets.
However, the responses of participants in a negative mood
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were expected to be symmetric: contrast with both upward
and downward comparison others. In the absence of
ambiguous information, responses in both positive and
negative mood conditions were expected to be symmetric.
Next, we examined the boundaries of self-serving
interpretations of ambiguous similarity information. In
particular, we further tested our hypothesis that information
must be ambiguous in order for self-serving responding to
occur. Whereas in Experiment 1, we examined the effect of
ambiguity by giving participants either ambiguous simi-
larity information or no similarity information about a
comparison standard, in Experiment 3 we examined the
effect of ambiguity by giving participants similarity
information that was either ambiguous or was explicitly
non-ambiguous. Again, this corresponds to the ﬁrst step in
the model presented in Fig. 1. The inclusion of non-
ambiguous similarity information allowed us to test how
ﬂexible or creative people in a positive mood could be.
Because the effects of positive mood are predicted to
require ambiguous information, self-serving effects were
expected to occur only when similarity information was
ambiguous and open to alternative interpretation.
Finally, as shown in the shaded box in Fig. 1, reinter-
pretation of similarity information is hypothesized to occur
only when initial interpretations yield negative self-evalu-
ations, and is expected to be effortful. To test this,
Experiment 4 examines how positive mood inﬂuences
responses under conditions of reduced cognitive resources.
Participants completed the mood induction task, were
asked to hold in their memory an 8-digit number, and then
viewed a comparison target. All participants were given
ambiguous information about the target, and neutral mood
control conditions were included. When participants were
under load, the positive mood effects on responses to
downward comparisons were expected to dissipate,
reﬂecting the resource-demanding nature of self-serving
asymmetric interpretations. Under load, responses of par-
ticipants in a positive mood were expected to appear
identical to those in a neutral mood.
Pilot study
The purpose of these studies is to demonstrate that positive
mood inﬂuences the interpretations of comparison others in
order to beneﬁt self-evaluations. Thus, it was important to
establish that mood, and the mood manipulations we
employ, are not associated with changes in self-evaluations
in the absence of comparison information. Therefore, a
pilot study conducted in which participants (N = 45, 30
female, Mage = 19.5) completed positive or negative mood
manipulations in which they wrote brief essays describing
an event that made them happy and still made them happy
or describing an even that made them sad and still made
them sad or a neutral ﬁller task. This autobiographical
method of manipulating mood has been found to be effec-
tive in creating long-lasting mood effects (Krauth-Gruber
and Ric 2000; Mosak and Dreikurs 1973). Participants
mood was measured using four nine-point items. Partici-
pants were asked to indicate, on bipolar scales, which word
best described them (1) 1 = negative mood, 9 = positive
mood; (2) 1 = sad, 9 = happy; (3) 1 = unpleasant,
9 = pleasant; (4) 1 = bad, 9 = good (Wegener, Petty, and
Smith, 1995). Then, they rated how well each of the fol-
lowing words described them on nine-point Likert scales
(1 = not at all me, 9 = very much me): intelligent, com-
petent, and successful. The four mood items were averaged
to create an index of mood (Cronbach’s alpha = .91) and
the three self-ratings were averaged to create an index of
self-evaluations (Cronbach’s alpha = .71).
A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed
that the mood manipulation signiﬁcantly affected partici-
pant mood, F(2, 42) = 18.44, p\.001. Participants in the
positive mood condition reported more positive mood
(M = 7.20, SD = .93) that those in the control condition
(M = 6.15, SD = .52), t(42) = 3.43, p = .001. Partici-
pants in the negative mood condition reported more neg-
ative mood (M = 4.98, SD = .98) than those in the control
condition, t(42) =- 3.80, p\.001. No other effects were
signiﬁcant, Fs\1. Thus, the manipulation of mood was
effective.
A one-way ANOVA was also conducted on the index of
self-evaluations. Those in the negative mood (M = 6.98,
SD = .53), positive mood (M = 6.98, SD = .80), and the
control condition (M = 6.82, SD = .67), did not differ
F(1, 42) = .27, p = .76. Thus, manipulations of mood,
alone, did not inﬂuence self-evaluations.
Experiment 1
To test the hypotheses that positive mood can inﬂuence
responses to social comparison targets and that ambiguous
similarity information must be present in order for self-
serving responding to occur, participants in Experiment 1
completedapositivemoodinductionmanipulation,received
ambiguous or no similarity information about a comparison
target, and completed self-evaluation measures. Ambiguous
similarityinformationwasexpectedtoallowforasymmetric
and self-serving responses: assimilation to upward compar-
ison targets and contrast with downward targets. Absence of
similarity information was expected to lead symmetric
responding, even if self-evaluations were harmed.
Distinctive similarity was manipulating by presenting
participants with targets with whom they did or did not
share a birthday. A shared birthday is ambiguous similarity
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information. On the one hand, ﬁrst hearing that you share a
birthday with someone can lead to feelings of shared
uniqueness, leading to assimilation, as has been shown in
previous research (Brown et al. 1992; Cialdini and de
Nicholas 1989; Finch and Cialdini 1989; see also Stapel
and Marx 2007). On the other hand, sharing a birthday does
not convey any information about shared experiences or
other meaningful similarities, and may be irrelevant for
determining similarity. Because the meaning of a shared
birthday is ambiguous, we expect that the ﬂexibility
afforded by a positive mood will lead participants to treat
upward comparison targets with whom they share a birth-
day as distinctively similar (leading to assimilation) and to
treat downward comparison targets with whom they share a
birthday as non-distinctively similar (leading to contrast).
Method
Participants and design
Female university (N = 47) students participated in the
study for monetary compensation. Only female students
were recruited to facilitate matching of target and partici-
pant gender. All participants received the positive mood
manipulation and were distributed among a 2(direction of
comparison: upward vs. downward) 9 2(cue: shared
birthday vs. different birthday) factorial design was used.
Procedure
Participants were recruited for what was described as
several unrelated studies. Before beginning the experiment,
participants completed a number of ﬁller tasks in which
they unscrambled words and named the capitals of Euro-
pean countries. Then, they completed the mood induction
described in the pilot study.
After completing the mood manipulations, participants
began the ‘‘impression-formation’’ task, during which they
were exposed to the social comparison information. Via
computer, participants were presented information about a
target. They were told that at the end of the session, they
would be interviewed about the efﬁcacy of this method of
person-information presentation. To manipulate direction
of comparison, participants were ﬁrst presented with a
picture of an attractive or unattractive female student. The
picture remained on screen while participants received
information about the target, including physical charac-
teristics, major, parents’ names, and birth date. In the
shared-birthday conditions, the presented information
indicated that target had the same birthday and astrological
sign as the participant. In the non-shared birthday condi-
tions, a different birthday was given. This type of infor-
mation has previously been used to establish general
similarity and yield targets appropriate for comparison
(Stapel and Marx 2007). After viewing this information,
participants conﬁrmed that they had processed all of the
information, and were told that they would return to it later.
Dependent measures After completing the impression
formation task, all participants reported their major, gen-
der, and age. Participants also rated their own attractive-
ness (How attractive are you?) on a seven-point scale
(1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Then, participants rated
the target’s attractiveness on the same 7-point scale.
Finally, participants were debriefed.
Results and discussion
Manipulation check
Conﬁrming the efﬁcacy of the direction of comparison
manipulation, the upward comparison target was rated
more attractive (M = 5.71, SD = .75) than the downward
target (M = 3.57, SD = 1.47), F(1,43) = 38.80, p\.001.
No other effects on ratings of attractiveness were signiﬁ-
cant, Fs\1.
Self-evaluations
Only when the ambiguous similarity cue (shared-birthday
information) was present, were participants expected to
respond strategically and asymmetrically: contrasting when
it beneﬁted self-evaluations (downward comparisons) and
assimilating when it beneﬁted self-evaluations (upward
comparisons).
A 2(similarity cue: shared birthday vs. different birth-
day) 9 2(direction: upward vs. downward) ANOVA
revealed signiﬁcant main effects of cue and direction of
comparisonsuchthatthosesharingabirthdayreportedhigher
self-evaluations (M = 4.92, SD = 1.14) than those not
sharing a birthday (M = 3.96, SD = 1.3), F(1, 43) = 7.77,
p = .008. No other main effects were signiﬁcant.
These main effects were qualiﬁed by the signiﬁcant and
expected interaction effect on self-evaluations, F(1,
43) = 5.99, p = .019. In the unshared birthday conditions,
participants responded with symmetric contrast to the
comparison targets. Exposure to the upward comparison
target led to lowered self-evaluations (M = 3.33,
SD = .65) compared to the downward comparison target
(M = 4.64, SD = 1.50), F(1, 46) = 6.95, p = 011.
However, in the shared birthday conditions, participant
responses showed asymmetric assimilation towards the
upward comparison target (M = 5.08, SD = .52) and
contrast away from the downward comparison target
(M = 4.75, SD = 1.54), such that direction of comparison
did not signiﬁcantly affect levels of self-evaluation, F\1.
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Experiment 1 provides a simple demonstration of self-
serving responding when in a positive mood. Supporting
our hypothesis, positive mood was associated with biased
interpretations of ambiguous information (same birthday)
that allowed for self-serving responses to both upward and
downward comparison targets. However, in the absence of
ambiguous information, positive mood was associated with
symmetric responses to targets, leading to both positive and
negative effects on self-views. The fact that ambiguous
information was necessary for self-serving responding
suggests that although positive mood is associated with
ﬂexibility, it is not associated with fabrication of reality.
Thus, positive mood provides an interpretative lens, not a
source of imagination.
Experiment 2
Having established that positive mood leads to asymmetric
responding and that ambiguous information must be present
for self-serving responding, Experiment 2 further explores
the effect by including both negative mood and neutral
mood conditions. Additional mood conditions are included
for two reasons. First, we argue that positive mood leads to
asymmetry in order to beneﬁt self-views via a cognitive,
information-processing route. However, one might argue
that mood-congruent processing (Schwarz and Clore 1983;
Tamir and Robinson 2007) is a more parsimonious expla-
nation. The inclusion of negative mood allows us to test this
alternative explanation. If asymmetric interpretations result
from mood-congruent processing, negative mood should be
associated with asymmetrically self-harming interpreta-
tions. However, if a ﬂexible processing style is responsible
for asymmetric responding in a positive mood, then the
constrained and conservative processing associated with
negative mood should lead to symmetric responses to
comparisons. The inclusion of the negative mood condition
also allows us to explore how the more conservative pro-
cessing style associated with negative mood inﬂuences
perceptions of ambiguous comparison targets.
Inclusion of a control condition in which participants
neither completed the mood manipulation, nor viewed a
comparison target, provides a baseline response that allows
us to demonstrate absolute assimilation and contrast effects.
Method
Participants and design
University (N = 141, 75 women) students participated in
the study for monetary compensation. A 2(mood: positive
vs. negative) 9 2(direction of comparison: upward vs.
downward) 9 2(similarity cue: shared birthday vs.
different birthday) factorial design was used, with an
additional no-mood, no comparison control condition.
Procedure
The experimental procedures replicated those of Experi-
ment 1 with the addition of negative mood and control
conditions. As in Experiment 1, in the positive mood
conditions, participants wrote about something that
recently happened that made them very happy and still
made them happy when they thought about it now. In the
negative mood conditions, participants wrote about some-
thing that made them sad. In both conditions, they were
asked to ‘‘go back to that time and think about how you felt
then and describe your thoughts and feelings and what
caused them. Try to hang on to the feeling to make it more
intense.’’ A control condition was included, in which par-
ticipants completed only the ﬁller tasks (e.g. naming
European capitals) and self-ratings.
As in Experiment 1, after completing the mood manip-
ulations, participants began the ‘‘impression-formation’’
task, in which they were exposed to the social comparison
information. In the comparison conditions, in order to
manipulate direction of comparisons, participants ﬁrst saw
a picture of an attractive or unattractive student (gender of
the target was matched to the participant and different
photos from those used in Experiment 1 were used) on
computer. In the shared-birthday conditions, information
about the targets indicated that the target had the same
birthday and astrological sign as the participant. In the
non-shared birthday conditions, a different birthday was
indicated. After viewing this information, participants
conﬁrmed that they had processed all of the information,
and were told that they would return to it later.
Dependent measures After completing the impression
formation task, all participants reported their major, gen-
der, age, and rated their own attractiveness and the target’s
attractiveness on seven-point scales (1 = not at all attrac-
tive and 7 = extremely attractive). Participants also
reported how positive or negative they felt at that moment
(1 = negative mood and 7 = positive mood) (Stapel and
Blanton 2004; Stapel and Koomen 2000). Finally, partici-
pants were debriefed.
In the no-comparison, no-mood induction control con-
dition, participants completed only ﬁller tasks, the self-
evaluation measures, and the mood measures.
Results and discussion
Initial analyses examining the effect of sex of participant
on mood and self-evaluations revealed no signiﬁcant main
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effects or interactions. Therefore, we collapsed across
participant sex in all reported analyses.
A no-mood induction, no-comparison hanging control
condition was included to determine the direction of
the effects on self-evaluations and mood. Therefore, anal-
yses of self-evaluation and mood measures were conducted
in two steps. First, a 2(mood: positive vs. negative) 9
2(direction of comparison: upward vs. downward) 9
2(cue: shared birthday vs. different birthday) ANOVA was
conducted, testing for main effects and interactions. Then,
following the strategy employed in previous research
(Jaccard 1998), we conducted single degree of freedom
contrasts comparing means in the factorial to the neutral-
mood, no-comparison condition to test if the observed
effects were consistent with our speciﬁc hypotheses.
2
Manipulation check
Conﬁrming the efﬁcacy of the mood manipulation, only the
mood manipulation signiﬁcantly affected mood, F(1,
132) = 340.44, p\.001. Participants in the positive mood
condition were more positive (M = 5.72, SD = .82) than
the control condition (M = 4.40, SD = .83),
t(138) = 5.61, p\.001. The negative mood condition
(M = 2.98, SD = .83), was more negative than the control
condition, t(138) =- 5.97, p\.001.
The manipulation of direction of comparison was also
effective. The upward comparison target was rated more
attractive (M = 5.98, SD = .69) than the downward target
(M = 2.46, SD = .74), F(1,118) = 716.92, p\.001. No
other effects on ratings of attractiveness were signiﬁcant,
Fs\1.
Self-evaluations
The data from the experimental conditions were submitted
to a 2(mood: positive vs. negative) 9 2(direction: upward
vs. downward) 9 2(similarity cue: shared birthday vs.
different birthday) ANOVA, which revealed the expected
three-way interaction effect on self-evaluations, F(1,
118) = 5.13, p = .03. The analysis also revealed signiﬁ-
cant effects of similarity cue, F(1, 118) = 21.84, p\.001;
direction, F(1, 118) = 131.87, p\.001; and mood, F(1,
118) = 14.48, p\.001. In addition, the two-way interac-
tion effects of mood and similarity cue, F(1, 118) = 18.84,
p\.001; mood and direction, F(1, 118) = 11.74, p =
.001; and similarity cue and direction, F(1, 118) = 14.11,
p\.001, were also signiﬁcant. In order to interpret the
three-way interaction, the positive and negative mood
conditions are discussed separately and comparisons with
the control condition are reported. All means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 1.
Positive mood As can be seen in Table 1, in the positive
mood conditions, direction of comparison, F(1,
124) = 14.79, p\.001; presence of similarity cue (shared
birthday or not), F(1, 124) = 18.61, p\.001; and the
interaction effect of direction of comparison and similarity
information, F(1, 124) = 9.39, p = .003, all signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced self-ratings. As in Experiment 1, when partici-
pants believed they shared a birthday with the target,
self-evaluations did not differ as a result of direction of
comparison. Compared to the control condition, partici-
pants in both the upward, F(1,132) = 13.76, p\.001, and
downward, F(1,132) = 21.53, p\.001, comparison con-
ditions rated themselves more positively. That is, they
asymmetrically assimilated to the upward comparison tar-
get and contrasted with the downward comparison target.
When participants believed that they did not share a
birthday with the target, they responded symmetrically and
contrasted with the targets, as in Experiment 1. Compared
to the control condition, they lowered self-ratings after
upward comparison, F(1,132) = 14.06, p\.001 and
raised self-ratings after downward comparison, F(1,132) =
10.69, p = .001.
Negative mood Among the negative mood conditions,
only the main effect of direction was signiﬁcant, F(1,
124) = 56.97, p\.001. That is, shared birthday informa-
tion had no effect. All participants in a negative mood
contrasted with the targets, resulting in lower ratings of the
self after upward comparison and higher ratings of the self
after downward comparison, relative to the control
condition.
Supporting our hypothesis, positive mood was associ-
ated with biased interpretations of ambiguous information
(same birthday) that allowed for self-serving responses to
both upward and downward comparison targets. In con-
trast, negative mood was associated with unbiased and
objective interpretations of ambiguous information. Across
comparison conditions, participants in a negative mood
treated shared-birthday information as irrelevant to the
comparison and always contrasted with the targets. This
pattern has two implications. First, it suggests that self-
beneﬁcial responses to comparisons are not purely repar-
ative processes; if they were, then negative mood might
2 These comparisons were conducted to test a priori hypotheses, and
only those means relevant to the hypotheses were compared.
However, in consideration of concerns about experiment wise alpha
error, more conservative tests of all mean differences using the
Tukey’s HSD were conducted. These analyses revealed a similar
pattern of signiﬁcant differences from the control condition, with the
only difference being that in the negative mood, shared birthday,
upward comparison condition differs from the control at the p = .07
level as opposed to the p\.05 level.
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have elicited them.
3 Second, it suggests that asymmetrical
responding does not result from mood-congruent process-
ing. If mood-congruent processing were the underlying
mechanism, then asymmetrically negative responses under
negative mood (contrast with upward comparison targets
and assimilation to downward) should have occurred.
In Experiments 1 and 2, in the non-shared birthday con-
ditions, participants were provided with other information
about the targets that could have been used in self-serving
ways, but was not. We argue that this is because self-serving
responding is limited to situations in which ambiguous
information in present. Experiment 3 tests this hypothesis.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that mood can inﬂuence
the impact of social comparison information and that when
in a positive mood, individuals interpret similarity cues in
self-serving ways. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants
either received ambiguous information or received no
information about similarity at all (they had no reason to
expect that they would share a birthday with the targets,
thus not sharing a birthday might be considered the default
belief and therefore not indicative of a lack of similarity or
relevance). These experiments demonstrated that in the
presence of ambiguous information, positive mood leads to
self-serving responding. This does not prove that ambigu-
ous information is necessary and this does not inform as to
the degree to which positive mood tints their perceptions of
the stimuli they encounter. In Experiment 3, in order to
examine the limits of this interpretative bias, participants
were presented with information that was explicitly
described as ambiguous with regards to distinctive simi-
larity or that was explicitly described as unambiguous with
regards to distinctive similarity. Because we argue that
self-beneﬁcial responses to comparisons may only occur
when comparison targets are ambiguously similar and
when ﬁne distinctions such as those between distinctive
and general similarity may be drawn, asymmetry in
responding was only expected when the similarity cue was
described as ambiguous.
In Experiment 3, the ambiguous information provided to
participants was that they shared an artistic preference with
a fellow participant (Stapel and Marx 2007). In the
unambiguous conditions, sharing an artistic preference was
described as being diagnostic of distinctive similarity. In
these conditions, individuals in a positive mood were
expected to act like those in the control conditions: sym-
metric assimilation effects were expected. In the ambigu-
ous conditions, sharing an artistic preference was described
as potentially diagnostic of distinctive similarity. Given
this ambiguity, individuals in a positive mood were
expected to act in self-serving ways. When faced with an
upward comparison target, ambiguous information was
expected to be viewed as indicating distinctive similarity,
leading to assimilation and when faced with a downward
comparison target, the ambiguous information was expec-
ted to be interpreted as providing no meaningful evidence
of similarity, making the target irrelevant and leading to no
response to the comparison target.
Method
Participants
University students (N = 96) participated in the study for
course credit. Only women were recruited for the study to
facilitate matching of participant and comparison target
gender. A 2(mood: positive, neutral) 9 2(direction of
comparison: upward 9 downward) 9 2 (similarity cue:
ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous) factorial design was used.
Procedure
Upon beginning the experiment, participants completed the
same positive mood induction and neutral ﬁller tasks as in
Experiment 1. After completing the mood manipulations,
Table 1 Effects of upward (more attractive) versus downward (less attractive) comparisons on self-evaluations, ratings of target similarity, and
use of information to beneﬁt the self as a function of mood and shared birthday information
Positive mood Negative mood
Same birthday Different birthday Same birthday Different birthday
Upward Downward Upward Downward Upward Downward Upward Downward
Self-evaluation 5.25 (.93) 5.53 (.52) 3.17 (.98) 5.13 (.72) 3.33 (.90) 5.20 (.68) 3.07 (.62) 5.35 (.70)
From Experiment 2
Mean self-evaluations in the control condition were 4.20 with a standard deviation of .86. All self-evaluations differed from the control condition
at p\.05
3 This also suggests that negative mood is not harming self-
evaluations, as previous research has shown that threats to self-
evaluations lead to self-serving interpretations of ambiguous
information.
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participants completed a task called ‘‘Aesthetic Prefer-
ences.’’ In this task, participants were shown four ‘‘artistic’’
line drawings and were told, ‘‘The following pictures have
been rated by a large number of students. Please look at the
following four pictures for a moment and circle the number
of the picture that you feel is the most beautiful.’’
Prior to indicating their preference, participants in the
ambiguous similarity cue condition, were told, ‘‘Some
previous research has shown that aesthetic preferences
reveal a great deal about people’s unique personalities,
while other research has shown that aesthetic preferences
are useless in predicting anything about people’s person-
alities. Science has yet to determine whether aesthetic
preference reveal unique aspects of the person, provide
general information, or say nothing about personalities.
The question has yet to be settled.’’ In the non-ambiguous
cue condition, participants were told, ‘‘A great deal of
previous research has shown that aesthetic preferences
reveal a great deal about people’s unique personalities and
we are interested in expanding this line of research.’’
After participants indicated their preference, they
began the same impression formation task as in Experi-
ment 1, in which they were exposed to the gender-mat-
ched comparison targets (and a different photo from that
used in Experiments 1 and 2 was used for female par-
ticipants). No birthday information was included. Instead,
in both conditions, target information indicated that the
target had chosen the same drawing in the aesthetic
preference task.
Finally, participants answered some questions about
themselves, ostensibly to determine whether their person-
ality and mood had any impact on the tasks they had just
completed. Participants reported their major, gender, age,
and then rated their own attractiveness (on the seam mea-
sures used in Experiments 1 and 2). Then, participants
rated the target on her attractiveness.
Participants also answered the following questions
regarding similarity to the targets (Miller et al. 1988; Stapel
and Marx 2007): (1) How similar are you and this person in
general? (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely similar); (2) To
what degree do you feel that there is a special bond
between you and the other person? (1 = not at all,
9 = very much); (3) How similar are you and this person
in aesthetic preferences? (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely
similar).
Results
To test our hypotheses, a series of 2(ambiguity of cue:
ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous) 9 2(direction of compari-
son: up vs. down) 9 2(mood: positive vs. control) ANO-
VAs were conducted on the dependent variables.
Manipulation check
Conﬁrming the efﬁcacy of the mood manipulation, only the
main effect of mood condition signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced self-
reported mood, F(1, 88) = 104.58, p\.001. Participants
in the positive mood condition were more positive (M =
7.33, SD = .86) than the neutral condition (M = 5.44,
SD = .97).
The manipulation of direction of comparison was also
effective. Only a main effect of direction of comparison
emerged, such that the upward comparison target was rated
more attractive (M = 7.33, SD = 1.19) than the downward
target (M = 4.17, SD = 1.19), F(1,88) = 170.34,
p\.001.
Self-evaluations
In the unambiguous conditions (i.e. ‘‘a great deal of
research has shown…’’) all participants were expected
assimilate to the comparison targets and only the simple
main effect of direction of comparison was expected to be
signiﬁcant.
In the ambiguous conditions (i.e. ‘‘science has yet to
determine…’’) participants in a positive mood were
expected to interpret the ambiguous information in self-
serving ways, leading to asymmetric assimilation to
upward comparison targets and contrast with downward
comparison targets. Participants in the neutral mood con-
dition were expected to interpret the ambiguous informa-
tion as uniformly irrelevant, resulting in no response to the
comparison targets.
In addition to these main effects, two two-way interac-
tion effects were expected: mood 9 ambiguity and direc-
tion 9 ambiguity, and by speciﬁc comparison tests.
Corresponding to the former interaction effect, when the
participants were in a positive mood, they were expected to
be uniformly more positive, regardless of direction of
comparison, than when in a neutral mood. Corresponding
to the latter interaction effect, When the information was
not ambiguous, positive and neutral mood responses were
expected to be the same. Therefore, mood was not expected
to moderate this effect. Because of this, the three-way
interactions were not expected to be signiﬁcant.
To test these hypotheses, a 2(mood: positive vs. neu-
tral) 9 2(direction: upward vs. downward) 9 2(similarity
cue: unambiguous vs. ambiguous sign of distinctive simi-
larity) ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant effects of similarity cue
(F(1, 88) = 11.40, p = .001), direction (F(1, 88) = 67.88,
p\.001), and mood (F(1, 88) = 9.65, p = .003). These
were qualiﬁed by the two-way interaction effects of simi-
larity cue and mood (F(1, 88) = 19.87, p\.001) and
similarity cue and direction (F(1, 88) = 59.27, p\.001).
Means for all conditions are presented in Table 2.
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Similarity cue and mood effects on responses As seen in
Fig. 2, our hypotheses were supported by the signiﬁcant
interaction effect of similarity cue and mood. When the
similarity cue was unambiguous, responses of participants
in the positive mood conditions did not respond in a self-
serving manner and did not differ signiﬁcantly from par-
ticipants in the neutral mood conditions, regardless of the
direction of comparison, p[.05.
When the similarity cue was ambiguous, participants in
the positive mood reported signiﬁcantly higher self-evalu-
ations than those in the neutral mood condition, regardless
of the direction of comparison, F(1,94) = 11.82, p = .001,
suggesting that they assimilated to the upward comparison
targets, and contrasted from the downward comparison
targets, resulting in uniformly more positive self-evalua-
tions. That is, they regarded the aesthetic preference
information as indicative of shared distinctiveness when
the comparison was upward and as irrelevant when the
comparison was downward. On the other hand, participants
in a neutral mood interpreted the preference information as
not indicative of distinctiveness or similarity and did not
respond to the targets.
Similarity cue and direction of comparison effects on
responses Examination of the interactive effect of simi-
larity cue and direction reveals that when the similarity cue
was ambiguous, no differences between upward and
downward comparison conditions were found, p[.05.
However, when the cue was unambiguous, participants
assimilated to the comparison targets, as expected, F(1,
94) = 92.47, p\.001.
Perceptions of similarity
In the presence of ambiguous similarity information, par-
ticipants in a positive mood were expected to perceive
themselves as more similar to upward comparison targets
relative to downward comparison targets. To test these
hypotheses, participant responses to the three similarity
questions were averaged (alpha = .87) and this similarity
index was submitted to a 2(mood: positive vs. neu-
tral) 9 2(direction: upward vs. downward) 9 2(similarity
cue: unambiguous vs. ambiguous sign of distinctive simi-
larity) ANOVA.
As shown in Table 2, the signiﬁcant main effects of
similarity cue, F(1,88) = 55.38, p\.001 and direction,
F(1, 88) = 22.80, p\.001, were qualiﬁed by the two-way
interaction effects of direction and mood, F(1,88) = 18.14,
p\.001, and similarity cue and direction, F(1,88) =
26.20, p\.001. These were further qualiﬁed by the sig-
niﬁcant three-way interaction effect, F(1, 88) = 15.32,
p\.001.
As shown in Table 2, and as revealed by planned
comparisons, in the presence of ambiguous information,
participants in a positive mood rated upward comparison
targets as more similar to the self than downward com-
parison targets, F(1, 94) = 53.17, p\.001. However,
when similarity information was unambiguous, partici-
pants rated the upward and downward comparison targets
as equally similar to the self, F(1, 94) = 1.00, p[.05.
Therefore, participants in a positive mood did not
respond in a biased manner. In contrast, in the neutral
mood condition, when information was ambiguous,
direction of comparison did not inﬂuence ratings of
similarity, F(1, 94) = .31, p = .58. Identical effects
Table 2 Effects of upward versus downward comparisons on self-evaluations and ratings of target similarity as function of mood and ambiguity
of similarity information
Positive Neutral
Ambiguous Unambiguous Ambiguous Unambiguous
Upward Downward Upward Downward Upward Downward Upward Downward
Self-evaluation 6.58 (.90) 6.50 (.80) 6.58 (.52) 4.08 (.52) 5.42 (.79) 5.33 (.78) 6.75 (.87) 4.33 (.78)
Similarity 7.06 (.53) 4.14 (.59) 6.81 (1.16) 6.81 (.63) 5.72 (.97) 5.44 (.69) 6.72 (.76) 6.83 (.80)
From Experiment 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ambiguous Distinctiveness Unambiguous Distinctiveness
S
e
l
f
-
E
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
Positive Mood
Control Condition
Fig. 2 In the presence of ambiguous distinctiveness information,
positive mood leads to more positive self-evaluations, across upward
and downward comparisons, than does neutral mood (from Experi-
ment 3)
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emerged when the information was unambiguous, F(1,
94) = 1.50, p = .83.
We further analyzed the relations between similarity and
self-evaluations in each of the conditions. When informa-
tion was unambiguous, self and other attractiveness were
signiﬁcantly related in the positive, r(24) = .87, p\.001,
and neutral mood, r(24) = .53, p = .008, reﬂecting
assimilation of self. In the ambiguous conditions, self-
evaluations were not correlated with ratings of target
attractiveness in either the positive or neutral mood,
ps[.84. However, in a positive mood, ratings of similarity
were correlated with ratings of other attractiveness,
r(24) = .70, p\.001. In a neutral mood, this correlation
was not signiﬁcant, p[.9. These results suggest that the
presence of ambiguous similarity cues allows those in a
positive mood to see others in self-serving ways.
4
Discussion
Supporting our hypothesis, positive mood was associated
with biased interpretations of ambiguous information.
When comparison targets were superior, sharing an esthetic
preference was regarded as reﬂecting greater similarity,
similarity was related to self-evaluations, and participants
assimilated their self-evaluations to the targets. When
comparison targets were inferior, sharing an esthetic pref-
erence was regarded as not reﬂecting similarity and par-
ticipants did not respond to the targets. In this way, the
resolution of ambiguity in a positive mood depended on
how interpretations might affect self-evaluations. However,
when the information was unambiguous, no differences in
perceptions of sharing an esthetic preference were found.
Whether the comparison target was superior or inferior, in
both a positive and neutral mood, sharing a preference was
regarded as highly reﬂective of similarity and participants
assimilated to the targets.
Experiment 4
Experiment 3 demonstrated that positive mood only leads
to self-serving responding when the distinctive similarity
information is ambiguous. Experiment 4 extends these
ﬁnding by testing the hypothesis that asymmetric
responding in a positive mood results from effortful rein-
terpretation of ambiguous information, after initial pro-
cessing leads to detrimental results. To test this hypothesis,
participants completed a mood induction exercise, were
asked to complete a cognitively effortful task, and then
viewed a comparison target with whom they shared a
birthday.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants were provided
with ambiguous similarity information. Reinterpretation of
this information was only expected when such reinterpre-
tation was necessary and when individuals had sufﬁcient
cognitive resources. Consequently, for participants not
under cognitive load, replication of the positive mood
conditions from Experiments 1 and 2 was expected.
However, for participants under load, replication of the
neutral mood conditions from Experiment 2 was expected;
lack of cognitive resources was expected to disrupt rein-
terpretation of ambiguous similarity information, thus
preventing participants from responding positively to the
downward comparison condition.
Method
Participants and design
University (N = 193, 103 female) students participated in
the study for monetary compensation. This experiment
used a 2(mood: positive, neutral) 9 2 (direction of com-
parison: upward vs. downward) 9 2(load: load vs. no load)
factorial design, with an additional no mood induction, no
comparison, no load control condition.
Procedure
The experimental procedures were the same as in Experi-
ments 1 and 2. As in Experiment 1, participants completed
either the happy or neutral mood exercise; there was no
negative mood condition. Second, all participants viewed
information about an attractive or unattractive comparison
target which included information that they shared a
birthday with the comparison target. Third, participants in
the cognitive load conditions were asked to remember an
8-digit number and to be prepared to report the number
when the experiment was ﬁnished (see Gilbert, Giesler, and
Morris 1995). Participants were not allowed to write down
or otherwise record that number, but were asked to hold it
in mind throughout the rest of the study. All participants
were able to recall the number at the end of the session.
Participants in the no load conditions were not given a
number to rehearse.
After viewing the comparison targets, participants then
completed the same measures of mood, own attractiveness,
and other attractiveness as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results and discussion
As in Experiment 2, a hanging control (no load, no mood,
no comparison) condition was included in this study and
the same analysis strategy was employed. First, a 2(load:
4 Complete data and results available from the ﬁrst author.
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load vs. no load) 9 2(mood: positive, neutral) 9 2
(direction of comparison: upward vs. downward) ANOVA
was conducted, testing for main effects and interactions,
followed by single degree of freedom contrasts to test
speciﬁc hypotheses (Jaccard 1998).
Manipulation check
As expected, there was a main effect of mood induction on
mood, F(1, 124) = 14.94, p\.001. Participants in the
positive condition were more positive (M = 5.35,
SD = .81) than participants in the neutral condition
(M = 4.60, SD = .93). In addition, the attractive compar-
ison target was rated more attractive than the (M = 5.58,
SD = .78) than the unattractive target (M = 2.99,
SD = .89), F(1,110) = 259.08, p\.001. No other effects
on ratings of attractiveness or mood were signiﬁcant,
Fs\1.
Self-evaluations
Analysis revealed the expected three-way interaction effect
of load, mood, and direction of comparison on attractive-
ness, F(1, 110) = 11.23, p = 001. The effects of load, F(1,
110) = 8.00, p = .006; mood F(1, 110) = 9.83, p = .002;
direction, F(1, 110) = 135.31, p\.001; load and mood,
F(1, 110) = 10.97, p = .001; load and direction, F(1,
110) = 10.44, p = .002 and mood and direction, F(1,
110) = 4.14, p = .04, were also signiﬁcant.
For ease of interpreting the three-way interaction, the
pattern of means is presented in Fig. 3, and the cognitive
load and no load conditions are analyzed separately, with
comparisons to the control condition.
5
No load conditions All participants in the study believed
they shared a birthday with the comparison targets; there-
fore, the positive mood conditions were expected to rep-
licate the positive mood and shared-birthday conditions in
Experiment 1.
The expected asymmetry among positive mood partici-
pants was found. Higher levels of self-evaluations relative
to the control condition (M = 4.20, SD = .21) were found,
regardless of whether participants upwardly compared
(M = 5.64, SD = .78; F(1,124) = 17.39, p\.001) or
downwardly compared (M = 5.15, SD = .81),
F(1,124) = 11.90, p = .001.
The neutral mood conditions replicated previous ﬁnd-
ings of symmetric assimilation (Brown et al. 1992).
Upward comparison led to more positive self-ratings
(M = 5.47, SD = .51) than the control condition,
F(1,124) = 17.89, p\.001, and downward comparison
led to less positive self-ratings than the control condition
(M = 3.24, SD = 1.09), F(1,124) = 10.37, p = .002.
Thus, positive mood led to asymmetric and self-serving
responses, whereas neutral mood led to symmetric
responses.
Cognitive load conditions Cognitive load was expected
to disrupt the self-serving processing of participants in a
positive mood, leading them to respond in the same manner
as those in the neutral mood conditions.
As expected, cognitive load disrupted the self-serving
responding associated with a positive mood. Instead, par-
ticipants in a positive mood assimilated to both upward and
downward comparison targets. Compared to a control
condition (M = 4.20, SD = .21), upward comparison led
to more positive self-ratings (M = 5.71, SD = .83),
F(1,124) = 23.14, p\.001, and downward comparison
led to less positive self-ratings (M = 3.09, SD = .94),
t(124) =- 3.30, p = .001. This pattern was identical to the
neutral mood condition, in which upward comparison led
to more positive self-ratings (M = 3.33, SD = 1.05),
F(1,124) = 18.83, p\.001, and downward comparison
led to less positive self-ratings (M = 5.53, SD = .87),
F(1,124) = 7.84, p = .006, relative to the control
condition.
Experiment 4 demonstrated that self-serving responding
associated with positive mood is resource-dependent.
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Fig. 3 Asymmetric responses to comparisons in positive mood are
moderated by cognitive load; responses without mood induction are
not. From Experiment 4
5 Again, in consideration of concerns about experimentwise alpha
error, more conservative tests of the mean differences using the
Tukey’s HSD were conducted. These analyses revealed a similar
pattern of signiﬁcant differences from the control condition, with the
only difference being that the high load, neutral mood induction,
downward comparison condition differed from the control at the
p = .13 level as opposed to the p\.05 level.
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When people in a positive mood were not under additional
cognitive load, they adjusted their interpretations of the
meaning of a shared birthday and responded to comparison
targets in a self-serving ways, replicating Experiments 1
and 2. However, when cognitive resources were reduced, it
was more difﬁcult to adjust the interpretation of the
meaning of a shared a birthday and, consequently, partic-
ipants did not respond to comparisons in self-serving ways.
Instead, their responses were like those of neutral mood
participants: They assimilated to both upward and down-
ward comparison targets. Thus, when cognitive resources
were lacking, the beneﬁts of a positive mood were muted.
General discussion
In four studies, positive mood led to self-serving interpre-
tations of ambiguous similarity information. When partic-
ipants were given ambiguous similarity information, they
categorized targets in self-serving ways. If the comparison
person was superior, they used the information to make the
target distinctively similar, basked in that person’s glory,
and boosted their self-evaluations. If the comparison per-
son was inferior, they used the information to make the
target either irrelevant or only generally similar, leading to
no response to the comparison target or contrast of their
self-evaluations with the inferior target. Overall, this pat-
tern of self-serving responding was not found when the
preference information was unambiguous or when partici-
pants were under cognitive loaded.
These studies establish that mood can determine how
people interpret and respond to comparison information.
These studies also revealed boundary conditions to self-
serving responding that provide insight into the underlying
processes. First, self-serving responses only occurred when
individuals were given ambiguous or ﬂexible information
about the relation between themselves and a comparison
target. In Experiment 1, when individuals were not told that
they shared a birthday with the comparison targets, they
were unable to respond in a self-serving manner. Likewise,
in Experiment 3, when similarity information was unam-
biguous, they did not respond in a self-serving manner.
Thus, while positive mood might provide cognitive ﬂexi-
bility, positive mood does not blind individuals from seeing
negative information. In the absence of ambiguous infor-
mation, self-serving responses did not arise.
Second, the effect only occurred when individuals had
adequate cognitive resources. That cognitive load derailed
the self-serving responses suggests that the ﬂexible pro-
cessing of comparison targets in positive moods is an
effortful process and may be a correction process (e.g.,
Gilbert et al. 1995; Stapel and Marx 2007). In Experiment
4, in the absence of adequate cognitive resources, positive
mood participants’ responses to the comparison targets
were similar to the responses to neutral mood participants.
That is, they were unable to make corrections or engage in
reinterpretation of ambiguous information in order to avoid
assimilation to the downward comparison target. This
supports our suggestion of a two-step process in which
individuals in a positive mood initially respond to social
comparison information in a consistent manner, and only
engage in effortful reanalysis of ambiguous information
in order to correct for the negative inﬂuence of social
comparison.
In addition, this ﬁnding contradicts an alternative
explanation that our effects are the result of positive moods
inducing heuristic processing and negative moods inducing
systematic processing. If heuristic processing were
responsible for how participants responded to the com-
parisons, we would expect the same level of processing of
both upward and downward comparisons, with symmetric
contrast (or assimilation) to both types of targets. However,
positive moods led to the use of a trivial similarity cue to
indicate similarity in the upward comparison condition but
not in the downward comparison conditions. In addition, if
heuristic processing were responsible for the effects in the
positive mood conditions, then inducing cognitive load
should not have eliminated the self-serving pattern.
Third, we found asymmetry only under positive mood,
not under negative mood. If self-serving responses were
only defensive, we might have found that negative mood,
an aversive state, would have led to an interpretation of
information that allowed for recovery. Alternatively, if
responses resulted from mood-congruent information
search and processing, we would expect that negative
mood should lead to asymmetrically negative responses.
Instead, negative mood was associated with processing of
information with greater neutrality, objectivity, and focus
on the data at hand, regardless of the consequence for self-
evaluations (for reviews see Bless 2001; Martin and Clore
2001).
Finally, the results of the present studies suggest that
asymmetric responses are not a result of using mood as a
resource (Trope et al. 2001). According to this model, a
positive mood can be a treated as resource to be expended
in the pursuit of accurate information. If this were true, in
this case, we would have expected that positive mood
would have been associated with contrastive responses to
comparison targets, a response that is associated with
information-seeking motives (Stapel and Koomen 2001a).
Indeed, in other research, the experience of self-afﬁrmation
is related to just such symmetric responses to comparisons
(Johnson and Stapel, in press).
In sum, these ﬁndings support the growing body of lit-
erature showing that positive moods can create an upward
spiral (Fredrickson and Joiner 2002). Numerous cognitive
178 Motiv Emot (2011) 35:165–180
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processes are associated with positive mood and in
responding to social comparison information; among these
the ability to make ﬁne distinctions between distinctive
similarity and general similarity may be particularly help-
ful. Individuals in a positive mood were able to convert
what could be considered negative feedback (one is less
attractive than another person) into positive self-evalua-
tions. Positive mood granted individuals the ability to see a
shared-birthday or a shared-artistic preference as mean-
ingful indicators of shared distinctiveness and similarity,
allowing them to assimilate to upward comparison targets.
Positive mood also granted individuals the ability to rec-
ognize a shared-birthday a meaningless indicator of simi-
larity, and allowed them to contrast with downward
comparison targets.
Future research might investigate how dispositional
happiness might be related to the self-serving bias pre-
sented here. If positive emotions do create an upward
spiral, consistently interpreting ambiguity in self-serving
ways might one way in which dispostionally happy people
are able to reap self-evaluative boosts from downward
comparisons and are buffered from the self-depreciating
effects of upward comparisons (Lyubomirsky and Ross
1997).
Conclusions
It has become increasingly clear that while social compar-
isons may be ubiquitous, the impact of social comparison
information is highly dependent upon the contexts within
which comparisons arise and the motivations of the indi-
viduals involved. The present studies add to the existing
literature by highlighting how mood can inﬂuence how
individuals treat similarity cues in their environment, such
as social comparison information. In the presence of a
positive mood, ambiguous social comparison information is
interpreted in a self-serving manner, such that positive self-
evaluations result. Thus, a good mood can beget not only a
good mood, but also beget a more positive self-image.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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